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Background: Single outbreaks have often been reported in health care settings, but the frequency of out-
breaks at a hospital over time has not been described. We examined epidemiologic features of all health 
care–associated outbreak investigations at an academic hospital during a 5-year period.
Methods: Health care–associated outbreak investigations at an academic hospital (2012-2016) were ret-
rospectively reviewed through data on comprehensive hospital-wide surveillance and pulsed-field gel 
electrophoresis (PFGE) analysis.
Results: Fifty-one health care–associated outbreaks (annual range, 8-15), including 26 (51%) outbreaks 
in intensive care units (ICUs), and 263 infected-colonized patients involved in these outbreaks were iden-
tified. The frequency of pathogens varied by affected location, specifically multidrug-resistant organisms 
(20/26 outbreaks, 77% in ICUs vs 2/25 outbreaks, 8% in non-ICUs; P < .0001) and gastroenteritis because 
of Clostridium difficile, norovirus, or adenovirus (1/26 outbreaks, 4% in ICUs vs 17/25 outbreaks, 68% in 
non-ICUs; P < .0001). Outbreaks occurred in approximately one-third of all units (37%) with some re-
peated instances of the same pathogens. Of 16 outbreaks caused by a bacterial pathogen evaluated by 
PFGE, 12 (75%) included some indistinguishable strains, suggesting person-to-person transmission or a 
common source.
Conclusions: This study demonstrated epidemiologic characteristics of multiple outbreaks between ICUs 
and non-ICUs and the value of molecular typing in understanding the epidemiology of health care–
associated outbreaks.
Multiple pathogens, including viruses, bacteria, mycobacteria, and
fungi, and multiple reservoirs-sources, including health care per-
sonnel, patients, visitors, surface environment, medical equipment,
air, and water, have been involved in health care–associated
outbreaks.1-5 Health care–associated outbreaks not only may affect
patients’ morbidity and mortality but also may have severe reper-
cussions in health care operations (eg, ward closure) with the need
for time-consuming and potentially expensive interventions.4
Single outbreaks caused by a specific pathogen(s) and a source
or reservoir have often been reported in hospitals. However, the
burden of outbreaks on a hospital over time is still poorly under-
stood. Although there are many publications of outbreak
investigations in a single hospital,4,6 they are likely to be substan-
tially affected by publication bias with larger outbreaks, and those
caused by novel reservoirs or routes of transmission, more likely
to be published. In addition, concern about health care facility
reputation and the risk of legal consequences may interfere with
data sharing and obscure the real impact of outbreaks on daily
practice in a health care facility.6,7 To our knowledge, there are no
published reports of multiple outbreaks caused by diverse patho-
gens at an academic medical center and the value of routine
molecular typing of pathogens associated with an outbreak over
time.
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In this study, we assessed all health care–associated outbreak
investigations based on routine practice, examined the value of
pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) of pathogens involved in out-
breaks, and reviewed lessons learned from these multiple
investigations at an academic hospital during a 5-year period.
METHODS
This analysis was conducted at an 853-bed tertiary care aca-
demic facility with 41 inpatient nursing units. Health care–
associated outbreak investigations at our hospital from 2012-
2016 were retrospectively reviewed through an institutional health
care–associated infection (HAI) database and monthly reports to
the hospital infection control committee. Using a laboratory-
based pathogen detection system to conduct comprehensive hospital-
wide surveillance, outbreak investigations were triggered by an
increase in number of infections or pathogens above baseline rate
in a unit during a specified period of time; an investigation may
also have been triggered by a single case of a rare and epidemio-
logically important pathogen.4 In this study, the number of potential
health care–associated outbreaks was counted as the number of
the corresponding outbreak investigations, including one with
only a single case (ie, Legionella). Additionally, a health care–
associated outbreak identified by molecular typing was defined as
(1) cases that overlapped time and space and (2) at least 2 isolates
linked by PFGE. Contact tracing associated with exposure investi-
gations of a single patient (eg, varicella, tuberculosis) with a
communicable disease were excluded from analysis. Variables in
the outbreak investigations included year, duration of outbreak,
location, pathogen, presence or absence of HAI, type of specific
HAI, number of patients infected-colonized, number of health
care personnel involved, presence or absence of PFGE with number
of isolates and number of different patterns when PFGE was
performed, and brief summary of infection control measures and
interventions.
Comprehensive hospital-wide surveillance for all HAIs, includ-
ing all sites defined by the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, was conducted through a chart review of each patient
in accordance with the Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion criteria.8 Our HAI surveillance included components of laboratory
reports of positive culture results, results of serologic testing or
molecular-based diagnostic tests, clinical reports of infections, mor-
bidity and mortality conferences, and autopsies. HAIs are classified
into one of the following 5 major infections with 14 specific infec-
tion sites: bloodstream infections, urinary tract infections, respiratory
tract infections (pneumonia and lower respiratory tract infec-
tions), surgical site infections, and other type of HAIs (gastrointestinal
infections; eye, ear, nose, throat, or mouth infections; skin and soft-
tissue infections; cardiovascular system infections; bone and joint
infections; central nervous system infections; reproductive tract
infections; and systemic infections). All surveillance data of HAIs
and outbreak investigations during the study period were entered
into an electronic database. This study was approved by the Insti-
tutional Review Board of University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill.
PFGE was performed for selected bacterial pathogens based on
likelihood of an epidemiologic link (eg, >3 pathogens overlapping
in time and location). We reviewed all PFGE analyses performed
during the study period. Environmental sampling of the hospital
and hand sampling of health care personnel depended on ongoing
situation of an outbreak or type of pathogen.
Statistical analyses were performed by 2-tailed Fisher test using
JMP 11 (Statistical Analysis System, Cary, NC); P ≤ .05 was consid-
ered to be statistically significant.
RESULTS
Fifty-one health care–associated outbreaks (annual range, 8-15),
including 26 (51%) outbreaks in ICUs and 25 (49%) outbreaks in non-
ICUs, were identified during the study period. The annual number
of outbreaks was almost constant except for 2015 with an in-
crease in gastroenteritis, whereas epidemiologic features (eg,
pathogen type) in these outbreaks substantially differed by year
(Fig 1). Outbreaks occurred in 15 units (36.6% of all 41 inpatient
units). Of the 26 outbreaks in ICUs, 12 (46.2%) and 7 (26.9%) oc-
curred in the burn ICU and the neonatal ICU, respectively. Of the
25 outbreaks in non-ICUs, 6 (24%) occurred in the bone marrow
transplant unit. An outbreak of Stenotrophomonas maltophilia in-
volved multiple nursing units. Overall, 30 (58.8%) outbreaks were
terminated within 1 month, whereas 4 (7.8%) continued for >6
months (ie, 1 methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus [MRSA] out-
break in the neonatal ICU, 1 carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae
[CRE] outbreak in the burn ICU, 2 multidrug-resistant Pseudomo-
nas outbreaks in the burn ICU). The frequency of outbreaks sustained
over 2 months was significantly higher in ICUs than in non-ICUs
(Table 1), and the burn ICU accounted for 52.6% (10/19) of these
prolonged outbreaks in ICUs.
The frequency of pathogens varied greatly by affected location,
specifically multidrug-resistant organisms (MDROs) in ICUs (MRSA,
CRE, and multidrug-resistant Pseudomonas aeruginosa) and gastro-
enteritis in non-ICUs (Clostridium difficile, norovirus, and adenovirus)
(Fig 2, Table 1). Of 34 bacterial outbreaks, an MDRO (22 out-
breaks, 64.7%) was the most frequent, followed by C difficile (7
outbreaks, 20.6%). Eleven viral outbreaks included 7 (63.6%) noro-
virus gastroenteritis, 2 adenovirus gastroenteritis, 1 enterovirus
meningitis, and 1 influenza respiratory infection, whereas 75% of
all fungal outbreaks (3/4) were caused by Rhizopus spp. A pseudo-
outbreak of Ralstonia insidiosa via a contaminated sonicator occurred
in a laboratory during the study period. The frequency of out-
breaks of repeated pathogens at the same location was 63%, and
outbreaks in ICUs significantly tended to reoccur more commonly
than those in non-ICUs (Table 1).
Of the 51 outbreaks, 47 (92.2%) resulted in HAIs. Gastroenteri-
tis (n = 18, 35.3%) was the most common type of infection, followed
by pneumonia (n = 9, 17.6%), bloodstream infection (n = 8, 15.7%),
and skin and soft-tissue infection (n = 8, 15.7%), whereas there were
no HAIs identified in 4 (7.8%) investigations. The type of HAIs dif-
fered significantly within or outside an ICU (Table 1). Overall, 263
infected-colonized patients (median, 4; range, 1-20) were in-
volved in health care–associated outbreaks. There was no statistical
Fig 1. Annual trends in health care–associated outbreak investigations at an aca-
demic hospital, 2012-2016. ICU, intensive care unit; MDRO, multidrug-resistant
organism; PFGE, pulsed-field gel electrophoresis.
difference in the number of patients per outbreak between ICUs and
non-ICUs, but health care personnel were significantly more likely
to be involved in outbreaks in non-ICU epidemics (Table 1).
Of 16 outbreaks caused by a bacterial pathogen (total of 99 bac-
teria isolates; median, 4.5; range, 2-20) evaluated by PFGE, including
13 (81.3%) outbreaks caused by an MDRO, 12 (outbreaks demon-
strated by PFGE, 75%) included some indistinguishable strains,
suggesting person-to-person transmission or a common source,
whereas 4 (outbreaks differed by PFGE, 25%) demonstrated only
unique strains (Table 2). Of 12 PFGE clonal outbreaks, 11 (91.7%)
were implicated in HAIs, whereas there were no HAIs identified
during a vancomycin-resistant enterococci outbreak in the 2013 bone
marrow transplant unit. All 4 PFGE different outbreaks caused HAIs.
PFGE were more frequently performed in ICU outbreaks than in non-
ICU outbreaks (Table 1).
Hand sampling from health care personnel was conducted in a
prolonged investigation of MRSA in a neonatal ICU which re-
vealed that health care personnel hands at times carried the outbreak
strain, suggesting deficiencies in hand hygiene compliance. Envi-
ronmental sampling was performed in 3 investigations during the
5-year period. Outbreak 1 (with air sampling) involved invasive cu-
taneous Rhizopus infections among immunocompromised patients
in the ICU because of contaminated laundry carts.9 Outbreak 2 (with
water sampling) involved susceptible P aeruginosa surgical site in-
fections in a neurosurgical ICU; all 4 patients had P aeruginosa strains
indistinguishable with those isolated from a sink aerator within the
ICU. Outbreak 3 (with water sampling) involved nontuberculosis my-
cobacteria skin infection at a dermatology clinic; Mycobacterium
mucogenicum was isolated from a water sample, but multiple dif-
ferent nontuberculous mycobacteria species (2 cases of
Mycobacterium chelonae and 2 cases of Mycobacterium abscessus)
were involved in the outbreak, and our investigation did not reveal
a possible environmental source.
Infection control measures varied for each outbreak, and mul-
tiple measures were often implemented simultaneously. The most
frequent enhanced infection control measure implemented was iso-
lation or cohorting (n = 37, 72.5%), followed by enhanced cleaning-
disinfection (eg, disinfection with bleach) (n = 29, 56.9%),
modification of care or equipment (n = 21, 41.2%), and enhanced
hand hygiene education (n = 20, 39.2%) (Table 1). Importantly, 7
(13.7%) outbreak investigations led to closure of the affected loca-
tion (norovirus: n = 4, other gastroenteritis: n = 1, influenza: n = 1,
and vancomycin-resistant enterococci: n = 1) and restriction of health
care personnel working off the affected unit (norovirus: n = 6 and
C difficile: n = 1). Besides enhanced cleaning-disinfection, a
ultraviolet-C (UV-C) device was used for terminal disinfection in 3
outbreaks (5.9%) because of vancomycin-resistant enterococci, C
difficile, or norovirus. Affected locations in non-ICUs were more fre-
quently closed to new admissions as part of enhanced infection
prevention efforts because patients in non-ICUs were commonly
mobile and pathogens causing these outbreaks (eg, norovirus, C
difficile, influenza) tended to be spread from person-to-person.
DISCUSSION
This study characterized the epidemiology of multiple out-
breaks over time at a single academic hospital. We have previously
described at our hospital substantial reductions in overall HAIs, es-
pecially HAIs in ICUs, through comprehensive hospital-wide
surveillance (2001-2012).10 On the other hand, there were still sub-
stantial numbers of outbreak investigations during the study period
(2012-2016); however, the data do not exist to assess how this com-
pares with other similar facilities. MDROs were the most frequent
pathogen in health care–associated outbreaks in this study, and
MRSA accounted for half of the MDRO outbreaks. Half of all out-
breaks occurred in ICUs, most commonly in the burn ICU and
Table 1
Epidemiologic characteristics of health care–associated outbreaks at an academic hospital, 2012-2016
Characteristic
Overall (N = 51) ICUs (n = 26) Non-ICUs (n = 25) ICUs vs non-ICUs
n % n % n % P value*
Duration
>2 mo 21 41 19 73 2 8 <.0001
Pathogen
MDRO 22 43 20 77 2 8 <.0001
Clostridium difficile 7 14 0 0 7 28 .0042
Norovirus 7 14 0 0 7 28 .0042
Repeated pathogen at same location 32 63 23 88 9 36 .0001
Infection type
Any HAI 47 92 23 88 24 96
Pneumonia 9 18 8 31 1 4 .0238
Lower respiratory tract infection 6 12 6 23 0 0 .0226
Bloodstream infection 8 16 7 27 1 4 .0496
Urinary tract infection 3 6 2 8 1 4
Surgical site infection 3 6 2 8 1 4
Gastroenteritis 18 35 1 4 17 68 <.0001
Skin and soft-tissue infection 8 16 7 27 1 4 .0496
Population
>4 patients involved in an outbreak 29 57 16 62 13 52
>2 staff involved in an outbreak 9 18 1 4 8 32 .0109
Genotyping
PFGE performed 16 31 14 54 2 8 .0006
Control measure
Isolation or cohorting 37 73 18 69 19 76
Enhanced hand hygiene 20 39 12 46 8 32
Enhanced cleaning-disinfection 29 57 11 42 18 72 .0483
Modification of care or equipment 21 41 13 50 8 32
Patient screening or surveillance 14 27 13 50 1 4 .0003
Closure of affected location 7 14 0 0 7 28 .0042
Restriction of work 7 14 0 0 7 28 .0042
HAI, health care–associated infection; ICU, intensive care unit; MDRO, multidrug-resistant organism; PFGE, pulsed-field gel electrophoresis.
*P values are shown only when P ≤ .05.
neonatal ICU. Importantly, outbreaks occurred in approximately one-
third of all units with some repeated instances of the same
pathogens, therefore demonstrating the importance of facility-
wide comprehensive surveillance for HAIs. Because we perform
hospital-wide surveillance, we do not think the distribution of our
outbreaks was biased by selective surveillance. We also found sig-
nificant differences in health care–associated outbreaks between ICUs
and non-ICUs. Assessing epidemiologic trends of outbreaks over time
can help health care facilities direct surveillance and prevention strat-
egies against health care–associated outbreaks toward these specific
types of HAIs, pathogens, and affected locations.
The most common outbreaks in this study were MRSA in the neo-
natal ICU (n = 6), MDROs in the burn ICU (n = 12), and norovirus in
non-ICU units (n = 7). Neonates have immature immune systems
and are vulnerable to HAIs, and neonatal ICUs are a high-risk setting
for health care–associated outbreaks.4,11 Severe patients with burn
injury are associated with outbreaks of MDRO that can lead to mor-
bidity and mortality in this population and challenges for infection
prevention and control.12-14 In both neonates and burn patients, use
of multiple invasive devices and contact with multiple health care
personnel are common. Norovirus is a leading cause of gastroen-
teritis in settings where rotavirus immunization is implemented,
and its outbreaks are often associated with genogroup II type 4
strains, posing a major burden in health care facilities.4,15,16
C difficile was also an important pathogen associated with out-
breaks, especially in a bone marrow transplant unit, and our previous
study showed that C difficile infection has been our most common
health care–associated pathogen in our facility.10 Leukemia pa-
tients were at a higher risk of C difficile infection and have been
reported to be associated with increased mortality in their cases
of C difficile infection.17 Transmission of C difficile infection was
thought to be predominant in health care settings, and infection pre-
vention efforts were prioritized on symptomatic patients, and the
substantial portion of C difficile isolates from symptomatic pa-
tients was genetically distinguishable by whole-genome sequencing
(WGS), suggesting diverse sources of C difficile, including asymp-
tomatic patients and environment.18
PFGE has been widely used as the gold standard for strain typing4
and has provided useful information in confirming or refuting epi-
demiologic links for MDRO outbreak investigations in our study
(Table 2). Recognizing outbreak status demonstrated by PFGE can
lead to reeducation of health care personnel to enhance infection
control measures such as hand hygiene, environmental cleaning-
disinfection, and disinfection of shared medical equipment. It may
also lead to consideration of a common source or reservoir. More-
over, when initial PFGE results indicate that clinical isolates are
indistinguishable, additional sampling (eg, environmental or hand
sampling) can be considered.
PFGE has advantages and disadvantages. PFGE is advantageous
to multiple cases by certain pathogen (eg, MDROs), prolonged out-
breaks, and outbreaks via environmental source. Disadvantages of
PFGE include that the method is labor-intensive, time-consuming,
and moderately technically demanding, and PFGE can have dis-
crepancy in reproducibility and interpretation among personnel and
facilities.19 An additional research investigation in our hospital using
WGS revealed that CRE outbreaks at the burn ICU, which seemed
epidemiologically unlinked, were actually genetically linked over
a prolonged period and were driven by multiple mechanisms of re-
sistance transmission among same or different species, affirming
other studies that WGS has become a better method for advanced
molecular typing in outbreak investigations compared with
PFGE.13,14,19,20
In a few of our investigations, environmental sampling contrib-
uted to identifying a potential reservoir or source of outbreaks.
Environmental sampling can be considered in some outbreak in-
vestigations but is not routinely recommended, and standard
environmental sampling method and interpretation of microbial
results is not well established.21 In our investigations, when out-
breaks caused by a dominant strain of a certain pathogen (eg, gram-
negative bacteria) among several patients continued for a prolonged
time or were considered to be typical of a point source outbreak
related to the hospital environment and medical equipment, en-
vironmental sampling was performed. In a prolonged outbreak (eg,
MRSA), hand sampling of health care personnel was performed to
emphasize the importance of hand hygiene.
Most outbreaks in this study were terminated rapidly by en-
hanced control measures. Unit closure and work restriction severely
affect operation of health care facilities, and commonly norovirus
Fig 2. Frequency of pathogens involved in health care–associated outbreak inves-
tigations in ICUs (A) and non-ICUs (B) at an academic hospital, 2012-2016. CRE,
carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae; ICU, intensive care unit; MDR, multidrug
resistant; MDRO, multidrug-resistant organism; MRSA, methicillin-resistant Staph-
ylococcus aureus; No pathogen, an investigation for patients with gastrointestinal
symptom has not identified a causative pathogen; NTM, nontuberculous mycobac-
teria; VRE, vancomycin-resistant enterococci.
Table 2
















hand sampling Control measure in addition to standard practice
Burn ICU 12 MDR P. aeruginosa VAP, LRI 20 0 10 3* No Isolation or cohorting, enhanced hand hygiene,
enhanced cleaning-disinfection, modification of care
or equipment, patient screening or surveillance
Neonatal ICU 4 MRSA SST 5 0 7 2* No Isolation or cohorting, patient screening or






CLABSI 4 0 4 4 No Not required
Neurosurgical ICU 2 MRSA RTI 6 0 4 2* No Enhanced hand hygiene, modification of care or
equipment
Neonatal ICU 2 MRSA SSI, BSI, conjunctivitis 7 0 2 2 No Isolation or cohorting, patient screening or
surveillance, enhanced hand hygiene, enhanced
cleaning-disinfection
BMTU ≤1 VRE No (colonization) 8 0 8 5* No Closure of affected location, isolation or cohorting,
enhanced cleaning-disinfection, modification of care
or equipment, use of UV-C device
Neonatal ICU 11 MRSA SST, VAP, BSI 12 29 20 4* Hand sampling Isolation or cohorting, patient screening or
surveillance, modification of care or equipment,
enhanced hand hygiene, enhanced cleaning-
disinfection
Neurosurgical ICU ≤1 MRSA RTI 5 0 5 3* No Isolation or cohorting, enhanced hand hygiene,
enhanced cleaning-disinfection
Burn ICU 3 CRE
(Enterobacter sp)
VAP, LRI 4 0 4 1* No Enhanced hand hygiene, enhanced cleaning-
disinfection
Burn ICU ≤1 MRSA LRI 3 0 3 3 No Not required
Burn ICU 2 MRSA VAE, VAP, CLABSI 4 0 4 3* No Isolation or cohorting, enhanced hand hygiene,
enhanced cleaning-disinfection
Burn ICU 4 MDROs† HAIs‡ 9 0 2 (MRSA) 2 No Enhanced hand hygiene, enhanced cleaning-
disinfection, isolation or cohorting, modification of
care or equipment
Neonatal ICU 3 MRSA CLABSI, BSI, GI 12 0 8 4* No Patient screening or surveillance, isolation or
cohorting
Medical ICU 2 S maltophilia VAP 7 0 4 3* No Enhanced hand hygiene
Neurosurgical ICU 3 Pseudomonas
aeruginosa
(susceptible)
SSI 4 0 7 4* Environmental
sampling with
water sampling
Modification of care or equipment
Burn ICU 3 MRSA Pneumonia, SST, UTI, BJ 5 0 7 3* No Isolation or cohorting, enhanced hand hygiene
BJ, bone and joint infection; BMTU, bone marrow transplant unit; BSI, bloodstream infection; CLABSI, central line–associated bloodstream infection; CRE, carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae; GI, gastrointestinal infec-
tion; HAI, health care–associated infection; ICU, intensive care unit; LRI, lower respiratory tract infection; MDR, multidrug resistant; MDRO, multidrug-resistant organism; MRSA, methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus;
PFGE, pulsed-field gel electrophoresis; RTI, respiratory tract infection; SSI, surgical site infection; SST, skin and soft-tissue infection. UTI, urinary tract infection; UV-C, ultraviolet-C; VAE, ventilator-associated event; VAP, ventilator-
associated pneumonia; VRE, vancomycin-resistant enterococci.
*PFGE results include at least 2 linked isolates.
†MDROs include MDR Enterobacter cloacae, MDR Proteus mirabilis, MRSA, CRE, MDR Acinetobacter, and MDR P aeruginosa.
‡HAIs include VAP and BSI with MRSA, and SST with MDR P aeruginosa, but no HAIs with Escherichia coli.
outbreaks resulted in these extreme measures.22 In addition to en-
hanced environmental cleaning-disinfection, an ultraviolet-C device
was used in a few instances. Increasing experimental and clinical
evidence for patient room disinfection using an ultraviolet-C device
has demonstrated their efficacy against health care–associated
pathogens.23,24
One limitation is that our analysis was conducted at a single ac-
ademic hospital and may not be generalizable to other health care
facilities. There are no standard criteria for a specific number of cases
to define a health care–associated outbreak and compare multiple
outbreaks, and there are limited articles reporting in a standard-
ized structure even in published outbreaks.6 Stone et al proposed
the outbreak reports and intervention studies of nosocomial infec-
tion statement using a comprehensive checklist and summary table
to improve the quality of describing these reports and studies
transparently.25 Reporting outbreaks in a well-organized and trans-
parent manner and sharing lessons learned from outbreak
investigations is essential because designing a high quality of out-
break investigations, including randomized controlled trials, is
difficult or impossible (ie, most outbreaks were reported by case
reports and authors’ interest). It is also necessary to devise practi-
cal epidemiologic indicators for evaluating an actual status of health
care–associated outbreaks that may not have been published in most
cases. In our facility, only a few outbreaks which occurred during
the study period have been published so far.9,14 Another limitation
is that few investigations determined reservoirs, sources, and trans-
mission routes because most outbreaks were addressed before
environmental or hand sampling was implemented and infection
control measures were prioritized as a practice.
In conclusion, this study demonstrated significant differences in
epidemiologic characteristics of multiple health care–associated out-
breaks between ICUs and non-ICUs. Our analysis also provided insight
into the usefulness of routine molecular analysis in assessing the
transmission of MDROs and understanding the epidemiology of out-
breaks. These findings are important to implement appropriate
infection prevention strategies against health care–associated out-
breaks and avoid prolonged transmission. Further pragmatic
approaches and research to improve comparability in descriptions
of outbreaks (eg, developing meaningful definition of a health care–
associated outbreak, establishing comparable epidemiologic
indicators of intra- and intertransmission of pathogens causing an
HAI) will be needed.
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